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Abstract: 
The aim of this study is to assess whether fuel prices in Greece respond 
asymmetrically to changes in the global oil prices. To do so, we depart from the current 
practice in the literature that focuses on fuel prices. Rather, we consider the mark-up of 
both the refineries and retailers. Even more, unlike the bulk of the existing literature, 
we take into consideration the whole supply chain, i.e. both the refineries and the retail 
fuel sector. Hence, we first assess whether the refineries’ mark-up responds 
asymmetrically to the global oil prices and subsequently whether the retailers’ mark-up 
shows an asymmetric behaviour relatively to changes in the refineries’ fuel prices. Our 
findings show that the Greek fuel retailers do not change their mark-up behaviour based 
on changes of the refined fuel price. By contrast, the asymmetric behaviour is evident 
in the refineries mark-up relatively to changes in the global oil prices, which is then 
passed through to the retailers and consumers. Finally, we convincingly show that 
weekly and monthly data mask any such asymmetric relationship. Thus, we maintain 
that unless the appropriate data frequency, fuel price transformations and the whole 
supply chain are considered, misleading findings could be revealed. 
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1. Introduction 
Global oil prices have experienced huge swings since 2007, when they 
fluctuated from about $60 per barrel to a record high of $145 in 2008 and subsequently 
dropped sharply at about $30 in late 2008, or even during the period 2014-2015, when 
oil lost about 75% of its price. Recently, during 2016 to 2019, oil prices experienced 
another period of abrupt change rising from about $30 (January 2016) to $78 
(September 2018), then dropping back to the levels of $50 in December 2018 before 
they bounce back to almost $70 in April 2019.  
Furthermore, over the last decade or so we have observed the increased 
financialisation of the oil market, which, in many cases, has driven oil prices away from 
their fundamentals. Such developments certainly affect the pricing strategies of oil 
companies and although this should primarily affect the upstream oil sector, given their 
large fixed costs. Nevertheless, similar observations have been extensively reported for 
the downstream sector, as well.  
Indeed, there is a wealth of literature that assesses the effects of global oil price 
fluctuations on the pump price and whether the response of the latter is asymmetric 
towards increases and decreases of the former (some recent studies include Valadkhani 
et al., 2015; Rahman, 2016; Apergis and Vouzavalis, 2018; Eleftheriou et al. 2018; 
Kang et al., 2018). This asymmetric behaviour has been characterised by a term coined 
by Bacon (1991) called rockets and feathers. The rockets and feathers phenomenon 
suggests that when crude oil prices increase then there is an immediate increase in pump 
fuel prices; whereas during crude oil prices decreases, pump prices tend to adjust at a 
much slower pace. Perdiguero-García (2013), Kristoufek and Lunackova (2015) and 
more recently Cook and Fosten (2018) provide an extensive review of this line of 
research. On the whole, the existing evidence demonstrates several interesting 
regularities.  
First, the reported findings do not reach a consensus since there are studies that 
find evidence in favour of the asymmetric behaviour (see for instance, Duffy-Deno, 
1996; Balke et al., 1998; Grasso and Manera, 2007; Blair et al., 2017), whereas other 
studies cannot provide any support to such claims (Shin, 1994; Godby et al., 2000; 
Balaguer and Ripollés, 2012; Karagiannis et al., 2015). 
Second, studies concentrate their attention to the effects of oil prices on the 
pump prices, largely ignoring the effects of the former on the refining industry (see for 
instance, Manning, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Godby et al., 2000; Meyler, 2009; 
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Rahman, 2016; Apergis and Vouzavalis, 2018). Delpachitra (2002) is one of scarce 
studies that shows that price adjustments in the domestic market do not respond 
effectively to changes in the international oil prices. By contrast, they report that 
domestic wholesale prices are the key to determining retail prices. Thus, the lack of 
competition in the wholesale market was found to be the main cause of the weak 
adjustment of retail prices. Galeotti, et al. (2003) and Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) 
also focus on the refining industry, although they reach to different conclusions. The 
former study focuses on five European countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and 
the UK) and show that asymmetric behaviour is evident in both the refining and 
distribution stages. By contrast, Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) study the US market 
and they show that the refining margin does not exhibit any asymmetric behaviour 
towards changes in the crude oil prices. More recently, Balaguer and Ripollés (2012) 
find evidence in favour of a symmetric behaviour of retail fuel prices to changes in the 
wholesale prices. 
Third, the most common data frequency that is considered by the existing 
literature is either weekly or monthly (e.g. Kirchgässner and Kübler, 1992; Shin, 1994; 
Duffy-Deno, 1996, Godby et al., 2000; Bermingham and O'Brien, 2011). Authors have 
almost ignored the potential effects at daily frequency with some exception to include 
the studies by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), Oladunjoye (2008) and recently Gautier 
and Saout (2015) and Lahiani et al. (2017).  
Forth, studies in this line of research most commonly employ methods such as 
the error correction model (or variants of this model) and panel regressions (see, 
Manning, 1991; Balke et al., 1998; Bettendorf et al., 2003; Grasso and Manera, 2007; 
Panagiotidis and Rutledge, 2007; Douglas, 2010; Balaguer and Ripollés, 2016, among 
others). 
Turning our attention to the Greek downstream oil sectors, the existing findings 
are rather inconclusive, as well. On one hand, Angelopoulou and Gibson (2010) study 
the aforementioned relationship focusing on the different prefectures of the Greek 
region and do not support the view that pump prices asymmetrically respond to positive 
and negative changes in the crude oil prices. They further suggest that any observed 
asymmetry is due to the tax changes. Similar results are also provided by a recent study 
of Apergis and Vouzavalis (2018), who report a symmetric pass-through of crude oil 
prices to retail pump prices.  
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By contrast, Polemis (2012) maintains that the reactions of the retail fuel prices 
to wholesale price decreases and increases are asymmetric. Polemis (2012) also studies 
the potential asymmetric responses of the wholesale prices to crude oil prices changes, 
yet he did not find evidence in favour of such asymmetry. The findings by Bragoudakis 
and Sideris (2012), regarding the retail sector, corroborate those of Polemis (2012). 
Table 1 provides a summary of some selected studies. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
It is rather evident from the brief overview of the related literature that there are 
certain gaps in this line of research, which are considered in this study. First, we are 
among the very few studies that concentrate on the whole supply chain from the global 
oil prices to the pump prices so to identify where there might be any asymmetric 
behaviour. Second, we consider three different data frequencies (daily, weekly and 
monthly) in order to assess whether lower frequencies mask any asymmetries.  
More importantly, though, we depart from the current practice in the literature 
that centres its attention on fuel prices. Rather, our focus is on the refineries’ and 
retailers’ mark-ups rather than refine and fuel prices. We do so since refine and fuel 
prices may not necessarily reveal the pricing strategy of both refineries and retailers. 
However, the asymmetric behaviour is expected to be impacted by the mark-up that 
refineries or retailers will charge on top of the purchase price of fuel. For instance, there 
could be cases where fuel prices may not change due to declines in global oil prices; 
however, this could be due to changes in taxation, while the mark-up remains constant. 
Hence, in such case, the identification of the asymmetric behaviour would be 
inappropriately identified. Thus, it is important to assess first whether the refineries’ 
mark-up responds asymmetrically to the global oil prices and subsequently whether the 
retailers’ mark-up shows an asymmetric behaviour relatively to changes in the 
refineries’ fuel prices.  
Brown and Yücel (2000) have claimed that the observed asymmetry in the pump 
prices could be sourced to the changing profit margins (i.e. mark-ups) of retailers, 
although they did not formally test this claim in the same fashion as we do in the present 
study.  
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the 
global crude oil prices on the Greek refining, as well as, the retail (petrol stations) 
sectors. In particular, we investigate the impact of global oil price fluctuations on the 
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refineries and retailers, focusing primarily on the unleaded 95 fuel, which is the most 
traded fuel in Greece. 
Succinctly put, our findings show that the Greek fuel retailers do not change 
their mark-up behaviour based on changes of the refined fuel price. By contrast, the 
asymmetric behaviour is evident in the refineries mark-up relatively to changes in the 
global oil prices, which is then passed through to the retailers and consumers. Worth 
noting is the evidence that weekly and monthly data do mask the asymmetric 
relationship. Also, we convincingly present that, unless the appropriate fuel prices are 
considered, we may reveal misleading findings. 
The structure of the remaining report is as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
and methods used in this study, while Section 3 discusses the empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the study. 
 
2. Data and methods 
2.1 Data description 
As shown in Section 1 and Table 1, previous studies mainly consider weekly or 
monthly data, employ error correction models and focus on pump prices. We depart 
from these standard approaches, considering daily data, employing a short-run model 
and focusing on the mark-ups of refineries and retailers, rather than on fuel prices. We 
maintain that in order to assess any asymmetric behaviour in fuel prices it should be 
performed based on the core profitability ratio. In this study we use both the retailers’ 
mark-up in pre- and post-tax fuel prices. Furthermore, we maintain that weekly and, 
more importantly, monthly data may mask any asymmetric relationship, given that such 
price behaviour should not be expected to hold for lengthy time periods. 
For the purpose of the current study, we use PLATTS price (as a proxy of import 
prices given that the cost of imported crude oil (CIF) prices were not available at daily 
frequency), refine prices, final pump prices for the unleaded 95, as well as, the total tax 
imposed on the fuel prices. The data have been obtained from the Greek Ministry of 
Economy and Development and the period of study is from the 7th January 2014 until 
10th April 2018 (1267 daily observations). The data period is dictated by the data 
availability of the daily data. Table 2 and Figure 1 present the descriptive statistics of 
the data and their visual representation, respectively. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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From Table 2 it is evident the very high proportion of taxes to the retail fuel 
price, which, on average, is about 65.5%. Another interesting observation from Table 
2 is the fact that the variation in retail prices and retail mark-ups are materially lower 
compared to the refine prices and refineries mark-up, respectively. This is rather 
interesting, suggesting that the refineries are engaging in a more dynamic pricing 
strategy, which possibly this is something that petrol stations cannot follow. Figure 1 
also confirms the high contribution of taxes in the final retail fuel prices.  
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Modelling Retailers’ mark-up 
We denote !"#(%&#)(#)*+   and !"#(%&#_#-.)(#)*+  the daily retailers’ mark-up without 
and with the effect of taxation, respectively. For "#(%&#_#-.) = 012	024+524+62	  and "#(%&#) =012	02	   where, 78#, 7#, 9:#, and 9;#, presenting the daily retail profit, refine price, fixed 
taxation and variable taxation, respectively. The 78# = <7# − 7# + 9:# + 9;# , with <7# denoting the after-tax retail fuel price. 
We proceed to the estimation of the most recent trading days that the retailers 
buy oil. The retailers buy oil at irregular days depending of the demand for fuel from 
the end users and the prices offered by the refiners. Hence, we estimate the average 
refine price of the K most recent trading days that maximize the coefficient of 
determination for the relation between the deviations of the refine prices and retailers’ 
mark-up. Hence, we seek to estimate  maxB C1 − ∑ FGH2IJK2LM∑ NO2(PQ2_2RS)TOU(PQ2_2RS)VIK2LM W  (1) 
for the regression: "#(%&#_#-.) = XY + X*Z{\U2]\U2^M} 	+ `#,  (2) 
where "U(%&#_#-.) denotes the average retailers’ mark-up including the taxation effect on 
the final fuel price. Z{\U2]\U2^M}  denotes an indicator factor of the form Z{\U2]\U2^M} b0 if fT* ∑ (<#Tg)BT*g)Y > fT* ∑ (<#T*Tg)BT*g)Y1 if fT* ∑ (<#Tg)BT*g)Y ≤ fT* ∑ (<#T*Tg)BT*g)Y , with <  being the PLATTS 
prices. 
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Naturally, we proceed with a numerical solution of the maxB (. ), as analytical solution 
is not available. The optimum number of the most recent trading days is f = 10 for maxB (. ) = 33.9% (see Figure 2).  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Hence, we infer that overall retailers purchase prices and subsequently their mark-up is 
shaping up from the refine prices of the ten most recent trading days. Based on the 
above, the estimated model is: "#(%&#_#-.) = nY + n*Z{\2]\2^M}# 	+ no(10T* ∑ (<#Tg)pg)Y −10T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)pg)Y ) + nqZ{\U2]\U2^M}#(10T* ∑ (<#Tg)pg)Y −10T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)pg)Y ) + r#,  (3) 
where Z{\U2]\2^M}  presents the indicator variable:  Z{\U2]\2^M} b0 if 10T* ∑ (<#Tg)pg)Y > 10T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)pg)Y1 if 10T* ∑ (<#Tg)pg)Y ≤ 10T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)pg)Y .  
Coefficient nY  shows the effects of the average PLATTS prices on retailers’ 
mark-up and no indicates the effect of the difference in the average PLATTS prices 
between time s  and s − 1. Equivalently, nY + n* show the effect of decreasing average 
PLATTS prices, whereas no + nq  denote the effects of decreasing average PLATTS 
prices at time s relatively to time s − 1. 
Given our interest to assess the effect of taxation on the abovementioned relationship, 
we further estimate the following regression: "#(%&#) = XY + X*Z{\U2]\U2^M} 	+ `#, (4) 
where, "U(%&#)  denotes the average retailers’ mark-up on the pre-tax fuel prices and Z{\U2]\2^M} presents an indicator variable, as previously.  
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 (A)symmetric behaviour of retailers to oil price changes 
Following the bulk of the literature presented in Section 1, we start our analysis 
by investigating the existence of asymmetric behaviour of retail prices to changes in 
global oil prices. The results for the retailers’ mark-up, including and excluding the 
effect of taxation, are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
[TABLE 3 and 4 HERE] 
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Both tables provide the same findings, i.e. that retailers seem to follow a 
different pricing strategy depending on whether the 10-days moving average PLATTS 
prices are increasing or decreasing. In particular, irrespectively of the effect of taxation, 
the indicator factor is highly significant in both the constant and the slope. The positive 
and significant values of n* and t* coefficients suggest that when the average PLATTS 
prices are decreasing, the average retail prices are higher (i.e. nY < nY + n* and tY <tY + t*).  
Turning our attention to the slope, we observe that coefficients no, nq, to and tq are all negative and statistically significant. This is explained as follows. When the 
moving average of PLATTS prices at time s relative to their moving average at time s −1 are higher, then retailers’ mark-up tends to diminish. This could be anticipated based 
on the fact that retailers reduce their mark-up for higher PLATTS prices, yet in actual 
values, their profits are increasing. Conversely, when the moving average of PLATTS 
prices at time s relative to their moving average at time s − 1 are lower, then retailers’ 
mark-up tends to increase (see no and to coefficients based on the opposite signs since 
we interpret the numbers assuming a decrease in PLATTS prices). However, we notice 
that when moving average of PLATTS prices at time s relative to their moving average 
at time s − 1 are lower during the low PLATTS price levels, then the retailers’ mark-up 
tends to increase even faster (i.e. no < no + nq and to < to + tq, based on the opposite 
signs).  
These results clearly suggest that there is an asymmetric behaviour in the pricing 
strategy of retailers; where during low PLATTS price levels they tend to increase their 
mark-up significantly more compared to the higher PLATTS price levels. Our results 
corroborate those of the existing literature, as discussed in Section 1.  
However, we need to make an important observation here. Retailers in Greece do not 
buy their fuel from the global oil market. Rather, they purchase their fuel from the 
refineries, hence the behaviour of their mark-up should be assessed based on the 
fluctuations of the refineries’ fuel prices rather than the global oil prices (PLATTS).  
So next, we re-estimate our models based on the retailers’ mark-up as a percentage of 
the refined fuel prices.  
Based on the above, the estimated model, without the taxation effect, is: 
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"#(%&#) = nY + n*Z{0U2]0U2^M}# 	+ no(10T* ∑ (7#Tg)pg)Y −10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg)pg)Y ) + nqZ{0U2]0U2^M}#(10T* ∑ (7#Tg)pg)Y −10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg)pg)Y ) + r#,  (5) 
The Z{0U2]0U2^M}  presents an indicator variable:  Z{0U2]0U2^M} b0 if 10T* ∑ (7#Tg)pg)Y > 10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg)pg)Y1 if 10T* ∑ (7#Tg)pg)Y ≤ 10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg)pg)Y , where 7  is the refined 
fuel price. 
The estimated model, including the effect taxation is: "#(%&#_#-.) = tY + t*Z{0+UUUU2]0+UUUU2^M}# 	+ to(10T* ∑ (7#Tg + 9:#Tg + 9;#Tg)pg)Y −10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg + 9:#T*Tg + 9;#T*Tg)pg)Y ) +tqZ{0+UUUU2]0+UUUU2^M}#(10T* ∑ (7#Tg + 9:#Tg + 9;#Tg)pg)Y − 10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg +pg)Y9:#T*Tg + 9;#T*Tg)) + r#,  
(6) 
The Z{0+UUUU2]0+UUUU2^M}  presents an indicator variable:  Z{0+UUUU2]0+UUUU2^M} b0 if 10T* ∑ (7#Tg + 9:#Tg + 9;#Tg)pg)Y > 10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg + 9:#T*Tg + 9;#T*Tg)pg)Y1 if 10T* ∑ (7#Tg + 9:#Tg + 9;#Tg)pg)Y ≤ 10T* ∑ (7#T*Tg + 9:#T*Tg + 9;#T*Tg)pg)Y  
and	79UUUUU#=	fT* ∑ (7#T*Tg + 9:#T*Tg + 9;#T*Tg)pg)Y . 
The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
[TABLE 5 and 6 HERE] 
It is rather interesting that when we generate estimates based on the appropriate 
fuel prices (i.e., refineries fuel prices rather than global oil prices), the retailers’ 
asymmetric behaviour disappears, regardless the incorporate or exclusion of the 
taxation effect. This is an important finding, as we convincingly show that unless the 
appropriate fuel prices are considered in this line of enquiry, we may reveal misleading 
findings. 
A reasonable question that follows is where the observed asymmetric behaviour 
may rest, if not with the retailers. Possibly, this asymmetry is evident at another stage 
of the supply chain. Hence, in the following section we test whether the asymmetric 
behaviour can be traced to the refineries.  
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3.2 (A)symmetric behaviour of refineries to oil price changes 
To model refineries’ behaviour, let us denote as !"#(%&5)(#)*+   the daily refineries’ 
mark-up, for "#(%&5) = 02T\2	\2	 , where 7# and <# denote the daily refine and platts prices, 
respectively.  
As in the case of retailers, refineries also buy oil at irregular days depending on 
the required amount and the offered prices. Hence, we estimate the average PLATTS 
price of the K most recent trading days that maximize the coefficient of determination 
for the relationship between the deviations of the PLATTS prices and refineries’ mark-
up. Hence, we seek for  
maxB v1 − ∑ ( w`#o)+#)*∑ N"#(%&5) − "U(%&5)Vo+#)* x, (7) 
for the regression: "#(%&5) = XY + X*Z{\U2]\U2^M} 	+ `#,  (8) 
where Z{\U2]\U2^M}  denotes an indicator factor of the form Z{\U2]\U2^M} b0 if fT* ∑ (<#Tg)BT*g)Y > fT* ∑ (<#T*Tg)BT*g)Y1 if fT* ∑ (<#Tg)BT*g)Y ≤ fT* ∑ (<#T*Tg)BT*g)Y  and "U(%&5)  is the average 
refineries’ mark-up.  
The optimum number of the most recent trading days is f = 5, for maxB (. ) =43.5%, as it can be seen in Figure 3. 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Hence, we infer that overall the refineries’ purchase prices and subsequently 
their mark-up are shaping up from the PLATTS prices of the five most recent days. Even 
though the number of days for the moving average calculation are endogenously 
identified, our finding is in line with the sentiment of the Hellenic Petroleum Marketing 
Companies Association (HPMCA). The estimated model is: "#(%&5) = {Y + {*Z{\U2]\U2^M} 	+ {o(5T* ∑ (<#Tg)|g)Y − 5T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)|g)Y ) +{qZ{\U2]\U2^M}(5T* ∑ (<#Tg)|g)Y − 5T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)|g)Y ) + r#,  (9) 
where Z{\U2]\U2^M}  presents the indicator variable:  Z{\U2]\U2^M} b0 if 5T* ∑ (<#Tg)|g)Y > 5T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)|g)Y1 if 5T* ∑ (<#Tg)|g)Y ≤ 5T* ∑ (<#T*Tg)|g)Y . 
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The results for the refineries are shown in Table 7. The evidence presented from 
the model of equation 9 is rather clear. Even though the {* coefficient is not significant, 
the {q  coefficient is highly significant and negative. Thus, similarly with the 
interpretation of Tables 3 and 4, we show that when the moving average PLATTS at 
time s relative to their moving average at time s − 1 are lower during the low PLATTS 
price levels, then the refineries’ mark-up tends to increase even faster, compared to the 
same behaviour during the high PLATTS price levels (i.e. {o < {o + {q, based on the 
opposite signs).  
These results clearly suggest that there is an asymmetric behaviour in the pricing 
strategy of refineries; where during decreasing PLATTS price levels they tend to 
increase their mark-up significantly more compared to the increasing PLATTS price 
levels. 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
Figures 4 and 5 corroborate our findings from Table 7. In Figure 4 we depict 
the symmetric behaviour between the refineries’ mark-up and the PLATTS price 
changes. It is evident that there is a negative relationship, yet we cannot clearly 
distinguish whether this relationship has a different behaviour during decreasing and 
increasing PLATTS price levels. The latter is exhibited in Figure 5. It is rather clear that 
the slope in the lower panel of Figure 5 (which is the decreasing PLATTS price levels) 
is steeper compared to the slope in the upper panel. Even more, the refineries’ mark-up 
levels are also higher in the lower panel (see y-axes).  
[FIGURES 4 and 5 HERE] 
 
3.3 Robustness tests 
For robustness and comparative purpose we run the same models using weekly 
and monthly data, which are the most common data sampling frequencies used by the 
existing studies. The results are shown in Table 8. We have estimated the models for 
the refineries only, since this is where we have identified the asymmetric behavior. We 
estimate the model in equation 10 at both weekly and monthly frequencies. For 
additional robustness, we convert the daily data into weekly and monthly using both 
the last daily observation of the week or month, as well as, the average daily prices of 
the week or month.  
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
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The results clearly show that the evidence of asymmetric behaviour disappears 
when we use the data at a lower sampling frequency, although some asymmetry can be 
observed in the slope of the regression model for the weekly data (see {* coefficient). 
Therefore, our findings clearly suggest that using lower sampling frequencies (i.e. 
lower than daily), which is rather common in the existing literature, is not the adequate 
approach to identify the possible asymmetries. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential asymmetric behaviour of the 
Greek refineries and fuel retailers on increasing and decreasing global oil prices. Unlike 
the bulk of the existing literature, we consider the whole supply chain in order to 
discover as to whether such asymmetric behaviour exists. Even more, we depart from 
the practice of the existing literature that focuses on the actual fuel prices, but rather we 
focus on the refineries’ and retailers’ mark-ups based on the premise that any 
asymmetric behaviour should be evident in the pricing strategy of these two 
stakeholders.  
Overall, our findings based on daily data show that the fuel retailers do not 
change their mark-up behaviour based on increasing or decreasing refined fuel price. 
By contrast, refineries’ mark-up changes relatively to changes in the global oil prices, 
which is suggestive of an asymmetric behaviour that is then passed through to the 
retailers and consumers. We further highlight that the use of weekly and monthly data 
mask this asymmetric relationship. Also, we convincingly show that unless the 
appropriate fuel price transformation is considered (i.e. mark-ups), we may reveal 
misleading findings. 
Our results certainly provide new insights in the investigation of the global oil 
price effects on refine and retail prices. The main implication of these findings is that 
Greek authorities may want to investigate the sources of such asymmetric behaviour in 
the refining industry and the possibility that it exercises monopolistic power over the 
refine price. If such a case is true, antitrust policies may need to be formulated. 
Further research could investigate the main drivers of the asymmetric behaviour 
of refineries mark-up to changes in global oil prices so to identify whether such 
behaviour is led by speculation, collusive behaviour or due to the cost structure of 
refineries. Another interesting avenue for further study could constitute the 
identification of asymmetric behaviour based on a time-varying framework. Finally, 
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similar econometric frameworks should be employed to additional countries since the 
potential asymmetric behaviour by refineries or retailers is a global issue. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Selected studies on crude oil prices and their impact on fuel prices. 
Authors (year) Method Frequency Symmetric or Asymmetric effects 
to oil price changes? 
Country 
Angelopoulou and Gibson (2010) Panel regression Monthly Symmetric responses to oil price changes Greece  
Apergis and Vouzavalis (2018) 
Non-linear auto- 
regressive 
distributed lags 
Monthly 
Symmetric and asymmetric 
responses to oil price changes, 
depending on the country 
Italy, Spain, 
Greece, UK, 
US 
Blair et al. (2017) 
 ECM Weekly 
Asymmetric responses to oil price 
changes US regions 
Boroumand et al. (2016) 
Markov-switching 
regression and 
MS-ECM 
Weekly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes France 
Bragoudakis and Sideris (2012) TAR-ECM Monthly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes Greece 
Chang and Serletis (2016) 
Structural 
GARCH-in-Mean 
VAR 
Monthly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes US 
Eleftheriou et al. (2018) 
Asymmetric 
spatial error 
correction model 
Daily Asymmetric responses to oil price changes US 
Karagiannis et al. (2015) ECM Weekly Symmetric responses to oil price changes 
EU 
countries 
Kilian (2010) SVAR Monthly Asymmetric responses to oil price shocks US 
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Kristoufek and Lunackova (2015) ECM, VAR, TAR-ECM Weekly 
Symmetric responses to oil price 
changes 
Various EU 
countries 
and US 
     
Liu  et al. (2010) ECM Weekly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes 
New 
Zealand 
Meyler (2009) VECM Weekly Symmetric responses to oil price changes EU 
Polemis (2012) ECM Monthly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes Greece 
Qin et al. (2016) 
Multiple threshold 
error-correction 
model 
Weekly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes US 
Radchenko (2005) VAR Monthly Asymmetric responses to oil price volatility US 
Radchenko and Shapiro (2011) ECM, VAR Weekly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes US 
Rahman (2016) GARCH(1,1)-in-Mean SVAR Monthly 
Asymmetric responses to oil price 
changes US 
Sen (2003) Panel regression Monthly Symmetric responses to oil price changes Canada 
Valadkhani et al. (2015) 
Dynamic Least 
Squares and 
VECM  
Weekly Asymmetric responses to oil price changes Australia 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 PLATTS REFINE RETAIL_PRICE_AT TOTAL_TAXES 
 Mean 0.3960 0.4219 1.5086 0.9829 
 Median 0.3871 0.4124 1.5120 0.9938 
 Maximum 0.5916 0.6259 1.7140 1.0330 
 Minimum 0.2314 0.2604 1.2960 0.9205 
 Std. Dev. 0.0695 0.0707 0.0943 0.0316 
 Coeff. Var. 0.1755 0.1675 0.0625 0.0321 
 Observations 1267 1267 1267 1267 
 REFINERIES_MARK_UP RETAIL_MARK_UP_PT RETAIL_MARK_UP_AT  
 Mean 0.0674 0.2534 0.0742  
 Median 0.0635 0.2473 0.0738  
 Maximum 0.2321 0.4895 0.1133  
 Minimum 0.0030 0.1320 0.0429  
 Std. Dev. 0.0293 0.0546 0.0101  
 Coeff. Var. 0.4347 0.2154 0.1361  
 Observations 1267 1267 1267  
Note: RETAIL_PRICE_AT denotes the after-tax retail fuel prices, RETAIL_MARK_UP_PT is the retail mark-up in the 
pre-tax fuel prices, RETAIL_MARK_UP_AT is the retail mark-up in the after-tax fuel price. Values are based on prices 
per litre. 
 
 
Table 3: Retailers’ mark-up (excluding taxes) based 
on PLATTS prices. 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. !" (Constant) 0.2562 0.0048 0.0000 !# (Dummy) 0.8596 0.1263 0.0000 !$ (Slope) -8.4463 1.6061 0.0000 !% (Slope*Dummy) -0.8538 0.1245 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2497  
F-statistic  140.5167  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are used. 
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Table 4: Retailers’ mark-up (including taxes) based 
on PLATTS prices. 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. &" (Constant) 0.0746 0.0008 0.0000 &# (Dummy) 0.0857 0.0204 0.0000 &$ (Slope) -2.3925 0.2507 0.0000 &% (Slope*Dummy) -0.0855 0.0200 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3417  
F-statistic  218.5219  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are used. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Retailers’ mark-up (excluding taxes) based 
on REFINE prices. 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. !" (Constant) 0.2492 0.0053 0.0000 !# (Dummy) 0.0100 0.0076 0.1922 !$ (Slope) -15.0954 3.2954 0.0000 !% (Slope*Dummy) 0.7080 5.0095 0.8876 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2768  
F-statistic  160.0846  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are used. 
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Table 6: Retailers’ mark-up (including taxes) based 
on REFINE prices. 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. &" (Constant) 0.0735 0.0008 0.0000 &# (Dummy) 0.0013 0.0011 0.2054 &$ (Slope) -2.5798 0.2870 0.0000 &% (Slope*Dummy) -0.0168 0.5256 0.9745 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5217  
F-statistic  455.9991  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are used. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Refineries’ mark-up based on PLATTS 
prices. 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. '" (Constant) 0.0639 0.0011 0.0000 '# (Dummy) 0.0015 0.0010 0.6612 '$ (Slope) -6.0463 0.2322 0.0000 '% (Slope*Dummy) -1.7386 0.2926 0.0012 
Adjusted R-squared  0.7347  
F-statistic  1162.1230  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are used. 
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Table 8: Analysis at weekly and monthly frequency: Refineries’ mark-up 
based on PLATTS prices. 
 Weekly Monthly 
 Last observation 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob. '" (Constant) 0.0686 0.0045 0.0000 0.0548 0.0096 0.0000 '# (Dummy) 0.0021 0.0080 0.7925 -0.0004 0.0121 0.9710 '$ (Slope) -0.2982 0.2706 0.2717 0.1783 0.2497 0.4787 '% (Slope*Dummy) 0.3978 0.3728 0.2871 -0.6516 0.4466 0.1512 
    
   
Adjusted R-squared -0.0036   0.0301  
F-statistic  0.7355   1.5168  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.5319   0.2224  
 Weekly Monthly 
 Average observations 
 Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob. '" (Constant) 0.0691 0.0032 0.0000 0.0658 0.0057 0.0000 '# (Dummy) -0.0027 0.0043 0.5259 -0.0004 0.0054 0.9400 '$ (Slope) -0.7399 0.1677 0.0000 -0.1861 0.1791 0.3042 '% (Slope*Dummy) -0.0046 0.1820 0.9797 -0.1828 0.2293 0.4293 
    
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.2626   0.1776  
F-statistic  27.2364   4.5270  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   0.0073  
Note: HAC heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are used. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Visual representation of the series. 
 
 
Note: Retail_price_PT refers to the pre-tax retail fuel prices, whereas Retail_price_AT denotes 
the after-tax retail fuel prices. 
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Figure 2: The ()*+ ,- − ∑ 012345637-∑ 893(;<3_3>?)A9B(;<3_3>?)C4637- D  for modelling the 
average retailers’ mark-up including the taxation effect. 
 
 
 
Note: The line shows the adjusted R-squared for the model in equation 2 at each 
K=1,..,70 trading day. The x-axis denotes the most recent trading days and the y-axis 
refers to the adjusted R-squared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.150
.175
.200
.225
.250
.275
.300
.325
.350
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
25 
 
 
Figure 3: The ()*+ ,- − ∑ 012345637-∑ 893(;<E)A9B(;<E)C4637- D  for modelling the 
refineries’ mark-up. 
 
 
 
Note: The line shows the adjusted R-squared for the model in equation 8 at each 
K=1,..,70 trading day. The x-axis denotes the most recent trading days and the y-axis 
refers to the adjusted R-squared. 
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Figure 4: Scatterplot between the refineries mark-up and the first 
difference in weekly average PLATTS prices per litre. 
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Figure 5: Scatterplot between the refineries mark-up and 
increasing/decreasing weekly average PLATTS prices per litre. 
Increasing weekly average PLATTS prices 
 
Declining weekly average PLATTS prices 
 
Note: The x-axes denote the weekly moving average PLATTS prices per litre and the 
y-axes denote the refineries mark-up. 
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